"...from my childhood, I have had a desire of a certain possession, just as another person may have had of a different thing; for one man desires to possess horses, another dogs, another gold, and another honours; but I was indifferent with respect to these things, but was affected in a very amatory manner with respect to the possession of friends. Hence I was more desirous of finding a good friend than the most excellent quail or cock; and by Jupiter, I preferred this to the best horse or dog. I likewise think, by the dog, that I should prefer the possession of an associate far beyond the wealth of Darius, or even Darius himself; such a lover of an associate am I. Perceiving, therefore, you and Lysis, I was immediately struck, and proclaimed you happy, because young as you are, you have so rapidly and easily acquired this possession; you with such celerity having made him so much your friend and he you. But I am so far from this possession that I do not even know after what manner one man becomes the friend of another. But in this I wish to be informed by you who are a skilful person; Tell me, therefore, when anyone loves another, which of the two becomes the friend of the other? Whether the lover becomes the friend of the beloved, or the beloved of the lover?" "Lysis", 211e-212b.

"[The poets] are, with respect to us, as the fathers and leaders of wisdom. They say, therefore, not badly, with reference to such as are friends, that divinity makes them to be friends, by conducting them to each other. But I think they thus speak: "Likeness to likeness, God for ever leads, and makes it known" [Odyssey,17,218]. "But these men are those that discourse and write about nature and the universe." "It seems to me, therefore, my friend, that those who say the similar is a friend to the similar, obscurely signify this, that he alone who is good, is a friend to the good, but that he who is wicked can never arrive at true friendship, either with the good or with the wicked." "Lysis", 214a-d.

"Do we not say, that the medicinal art is a friend for the sake of health? -Yes. -And therefore, that health is a friend? - Entirely so. -If then it is a friend, it is for the sake of something. -It is. -But it is the friend of something, from what we have asserted to before. -Entirely so. -Will not therefore that again be a friend, for the sake of a friend? -Yes. -Is it not therefore necessary that thus proceeding, we should reject what we have said, and arrive at a certain principle, which is not referred to another friend, but brings us to that which is the first friend, and for the sake of which we say all other things are friends? -It is necessary. -This then is what I say, that we should be cautious lest we are deceived by all those other particulars which we assert to be friends for the sake of the first friend, and which are as it were certain images of it; while, in the mean time, the first friend is truly a friend." "Lysis", 219b-e.

"That friend, therefore, in which all other things end, which we say are friends for the sake of another friend, is not in any respect similar to these." "Lysis", 220d. "You, therefore, [Menexenus and Lysis] if you were friends to each other, would be naturally allied. They replied, And very much so. - And hence, I said, if any one person desires or loves another, O boys, he can never either desire or love, or be a friend, unless he is allied to the object of his love, either according to his soul, or a certain custom of his soul, or according to manners, or according to species." "It is necessary therefore, that he who is a genuine, and not a pretended lover, should be beloved by the objects of his love." "Lysis" 222b.

Philosophia, friendship for wisdom, creating an alliance for Truth,
brings the community from a corrupted state to justice and harmony.

"I come to you, O Plato, an exile, but I am neither indigent of horses nor soldiers to oppose my enemies, especially able to convert young men to probity and justice, and unite them in friendship and fellowship with each other". Plato, "Letter VII", 328d.

"Can you then find any thing more allied to wisdom than truth? How can we? said he. Is it possible then that the same genius can be philosophic, and at the same time a lover of falsehood? By no means. He then who is in reality a lover of learning, ought immediately from his infancy to be the friend of all truth. By all means. But we know somehow, that whoever has his desires vehemently verging to one thing, has them upon this very account weaker as to other things, as a current divides its channel. Why are they not? But whosoever hath his desires running out after learning, and every thing of this kind, would be conversant, I think, about the pleasure of the soul itself, and would forsake those pleasures which arise from the body, provided he be not a counterfeit, but some real philosopher." "...pusillanimity is most opposite to a soul which is always to pursue earnestly and..." "The Republic", Book VI, 485d-486a.

"We must say then that this end of the web of politic action is then rightly woven, when the royal art, connecting the manners of brave and temperate men by concord and friendship, collects together their life in common, producing the most magnificent and excellent of all webs; - and besides this, when, embracing in common all others in the city, both slaves and free-born, it holds them together by this texture, and governs and presides over the city in such a manner that nothing may in any respect be wanting which is requisite to its felicity." "Politics", 312b.

Is the conventional law of the City in conflict with nature?
Harmony between opposites through a common aim.

"But I think nature herself evinces, that the better should possess more than the worse, and the more powerful than the more imbecile. But she manifests in many places, both in other animals, and in whole cities and families of men, that the just should be established in such a manner, as that the more excellent may rule over, and possess more than, the less excellent."
"SOC. Not by law therefore only is it more base to do an injury than to be injured, or just to have equality of possessions, but likewise according to nature. So that you appear not to have spoken the truth above, nor to have rightly accused me, in saying that law and nature are contrary to each other; which I also perceiving, I have acted fraudulently in my discourse with you, by leading him to law, who says a thing is according to nature; and to nature, who says a thing is according to law." Plato, "Gorgias", 483c-d and 489b.

""The one", says he [Heraclitus], "disagreeing with itself, yet proceeds in amicable Concord; like the harmony made by the bow and the lyre". Now it is very absurd to say, that in harmony, any disagreement can find place; or that the components of harmony can ever disagree." "...but it is impossible that any agreement should be between disagreeing things, so long as they disagree: and no less impossible is it, that things between which there is no agreement should at the same time harmonize together, so as to produce harmony. And as it is with sound so is it with motion; the quick measures and the slow ones, by nature disagreeing, but afterwards brought to agree, compose rhythm. In both these cases, where things differ and are opposite to one another, it is the art of music which brings about the reconciliation and agreement; just as the art of medicine does in the former case; inspiring them in the same manner with the spirit of love and concord." "The Banquet", or "Symposium", speech of Eryximachus, 187a-c.

"Socrates: O beloved Pan, and all ye other Gods, who are residents of this place, grant that I may become beautiful within, and that whatever I possess externally may be friendly to my inward attainments!" "Phaedrus: Pray also in the same manner for me; for the possessions of friends are common". "Phaedrus", 279b-c.

ARISTOTLE "Nicomachian Ethics". Kinds of friendship and cohesion of the community.

"...in every community there is thought to be some form of justice and of friendship too." "And the extend of their association is the extend of their friendship, as it is the extend to which justice exists between them. And the proverb "what friends have is common property" expresses the truth; for friendship depends on community". "...all forms of community are like parts of a political community". The political community "aims not at present advantage, but at what is advantageous for life as a whole." "...the particular kinds of friendship will correspond to the particular kinds of community." Book VII, 9.

Friendship "is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to live, though he had all other goods." "Friendship seems too, to hold states together, and lawgivers care more for it than for justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all and expel faction as their worst enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice, while when they are just they need friendship as well, and the truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality. But it is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those who love their own and that is to be a fine thing to have many friends; and again we think that it is the same people that are good men and are friends." Book VIII, chapter 1.

"The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we come to know the object of love. For not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this is good, pleasant or useful, so that it is the good and the useful that are lovable as ends. Do men love, then, the good or what is good for them? These sometimes clash. So too with regard to the pleasant. Now it is thought that each loves what is good for himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable, and what is good for each man is lovable for him; but each man loves not what is good for him but what seems good. This however will make no difference; we shall just have to say that this is 'that which seems lovable'." "To be friends, then, they must be mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each other for one of the aforesaid reasons." Book VIII, 2.

"Now these reasons differ from each other in kind; so, therefore, do the corresponding forms of love and friendship. There are therefore three kinds of friendship, equal in number to the things that are lovable; with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized love, and those who love each other wish well to each other in that respect in which they love one another. Now those who love each other for their utility do not love each other for themselves but in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So too with those who love for the sake of pleasure; it is not for their character that men love ready-witted people, but because they find them pleasant. Therefore those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves, and not in so far as the other is the person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant. And thus these friendships are only incidental; for it is not as being the man he is that the loved person is loved, but as providing some good or pleasure. Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved, if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the one party is no longer pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him. Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and they are good themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good and goodness is an enduring thing. And each is good without qualification and to his friend, for the good are both good without qualification and useful to each other. So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant both without qualification and to each other, since to each his own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the actions of the good are the same or like."

"Love and friendship therefore are found most and in their best form between such men. But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent; for such men are rare. Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity; as the proverb says, men cannot know each other till they have 'eaten salt together'; nor can they admit each other to friendship or be friends till each has been found lovable and been trusted by each. Those who quickly show the marks of friendship to each other wish to be friends, but are not friends unless they both are lovable and know the fact; for a wish for friendship may arise quickly, but friendship does not." Book VIII, 3.
"...in friendships based on virtue, complaints do not arise, but the purpose of the doer is a sort of measure; for in purpose lies the essential element of virtue and character." Book VIII, 13. "In all friendships between dissimilar it is, as we have said, proportion that equalizes the parties and preserves the friendship." "Differences arise when they get is something different and not what they desire", "for what each in fact wants is what he attends to, and it is for the sake of that that he will give what he has." Book IX, 1.

"Another question that arises is whether friendships should or should not be broken off?"; "if one accepts another man as good and he turns out badly and is seen to do so, must one still love him? Surely it is impossible, since not everything can be loved; for it is not one's duty to be a lover of evil, nor to become like what is bad; and we have said that like is dear like. Must the friendship, then, be forthwith broken off? Or is this not so in all cases, but only when one's friends are incurable in their wickedness?" Book IX, 3

"Good will seems, then, to be a beginning of friendship, as the pleasure of the eye is the beginning of love." "...it is not possible for people to be friends if they have not come to feel good will for each other, but those who feel good will are not for all that friends; for they only wish well for those for whom they feel good will, and would not do anything with them or take any trouble for them." "In general, good will arises on account of some excellence and worth, when one man seems to another beautiful or brave or something of the sort, as we pointed out in the case of competitors in a contest." Book IX, 5.

"Unanimity too seems to be a friendly relation." "Unanimity seems, then, to be political friendship, as indeed it is commonly said to be; for it is concerned with things that are to our interest and have an influence on our life. Now such unanimity is found among good men; for they are unanimous both in themselves and with one another being, so to say, of one mind (for the wishes of such men are constant and not at the mercy of opposing currents like a strait of the sea, and they wish for what is just and advantageous, and these are the objects of their common endeavour as well." Book IX, 6.

"Friendship is a partnership, and as a man is to himself, so he is to his friend". "And whatever existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for whose sake they value life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with their friends; "spending their days together in whatever they love most in life; for since they wish to live with their friends, they do and share in those things which give them the sense of living together. Thus the friendship of bad men turns out an evil thing (for because of their instability they unite in bad pursuits, and besides they become evil by becoming like each other), while the friendship of good men is good, being augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better too by their activities and by improving each other; for from each other they take the mould of the characteristics they approve." Book IX, 12.

ARISTOTLE, "Eudemian Ethics". Reciprocity and loyalty. Building trust.

"For to promote friendship is thought to be the special task of political science ; and people say that it is on this account that goodness is a valuable thing, for persons wrongfully treated by one another cannot be each other's friends. Further- more we all say that justice and injustice are chiefly displayed towards friends ; it is thought that a good man is a friendly man, and that friendship is a state of the moral character ; and if one wishes to make men not act unjustly, it is enough to make them friends, for true friends do not wrong one another. But neither will men act unjustly if they are just; therefore justice and friendship are either the same or nearly the same thing." "And our private rights in relation to our friends depend only on ourselves, whereas our rights in relation to the rest of men are established by law and do not depend on us." Book VII, I, 1-4 and 6.

"And a man becomes a friend when while receiving affection he returns it, and when he and the other friend are in some way aware of this." Book VII, II, 8. "...the primary friendship, that of the good, is mutual reciprocity of affection and purpose". "This friendship, therefore only occurs in man, for he alone perceives purpose; but the other forms occur also in the lower animals. Indeed mutual utility manifestly exists to some small extent between the domestic animals and man, and between animals themselves..." Book VII, II, 16.

"...a friend is not to be had without trial and is not a matter of a single day, but time is needed; hence the 'peck of salt' has come to be proverbial. At the same time if a friend is really to be your friend he must be not only good absolutely but also good to you; for a man is good absolutely by being good, but he is a friend by being good to another, and he is both good absolutely and a friend when both these attributes harmonize together, so that what is good absolutely is also good for another person; or also he may be not good absolutely yet good to another because useful. But being a friend of many people at once is prevented even by the factor of affection, for it is not possible for affection to be active in relation to many at once." Book VII, II, 46-48.

"And all constitutions (polities or republics) are some species of justice; for they are partnerships (communities), and every partnership (or community) is founded on justice, so that there are as many species of justice and of partnership as there are of friendship, and all these species border on each other". "All forms of constitution exist together in the household..." Book VIII, IX, 1-3.

"Civic friendship on the other hand is constituted in the fullest degree on the principle of utility, for it seems to be the individual's lack of self-sufficiency that makes these unions permanent." "...the justice that underlies a friendship of utility is in the highest degree just, because this is the civic principle of justice." VIII, X, 2-3. "Friendship on a footing of equality is civic friendship. Civic friendship is, it is true, based on utility, and fellow-citizens are one another's friends in the same way as different cities are..." VIII, X, 14. "...we must need friends who are worthy of our society." VII, XII, 4

"A friend is another self", "what is most akin", "To perceive and to know a friend, therefore, is necessarily in a manner to perceive and in a manner to know oneself." VII, XII, 13-14.
"Every State is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good."  

"Our purpose is to consider what form of political community is best of all for those who are most able to realize their ideal of life."  

This community of wives and children seems better suited to the husbandmen than to the guardians, for if they have wives and children in common, they will be bound to one another by weaker ties, as a subject class should be, and they will remain obedient and not rebel. In a word, the result of such a law would be just the opposite of which good laws ought to have, and the intention of Socrates in making these regulations about women and children would defeat itself. For friendship we believe to believe to be the greatest good of states and the preservative of them against revolutions; neither is there anything which Socrates so greatly lauds as the unity of the state which he and all the world declare to be created by friendship. But the unity which he commends would be like that of the lovers in the Symposium, who, as Aristophanes says, desire to grow together in the excess of their affection, and from being two to become one, in which case one or both would certainly perish. Whereas in a state having women and children common, love will be watery; and the father will certainly not say 'my son,' or the son 'my father.' As a little sweet wine mingled with a great deal of water is imperceptible in the mixture, so, in this sort of community, the idea of relationship which is based upon these names will be lost; there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the son, or the son about the father, or brothers about one another. Of the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection -- that a thing is your own and that it is your only one -- neither can exist in such a state as this.

Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the rank of husbandmen or of artisans to that of guardians, and from the rank of guardians into a lower rank, will be very difficult to arrange; the givers or transferrers cannot but know whom they are giving and transferring, and to whom. And the previously mentioned evils, such as assaults, unlawful loves, homicides, will happen more often amongst those who are transferred to the lower classes, or who have a place assigned to them among the guardians; for they will no longer call the members of the class they have left brothers, and children, and fathers, and mothers, and will not, therefore, be afraid of committing any crimes by reason of consanguinity. Touching the community of wives and children, let this be our conclusion."  

"The state, as I was saying, is a plurality which should be united and made in to a community by education."  

"Hence arise in cities family connections, brotherhoods, common sacrifices, amusements which draw men together. But these are created by friendship, for the will to live together is friendship. The end of the state is the good life, and these are the means towards it. And the state is the union of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing life, by which we mean a happy and honourable life. Our conclusion, then, is that political society exists for the sake of noble actions, and not of mere companionship. Hence they who contribute most to such a society have a greater share in it than those who have the same or a greater freedom or nobility of birth but are inferior to them in political virtue; or than those who exceed them in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue."  

"A constitution is the organization of offices in a state, and determines what is to be the governing body, and what is the end of each community. But laws are not to be confounded with the principles of the constitution; they are the rules according to which the magistrates should administer the state, and proceed against offenders. So that we must know the varieties, and the number of varieties, of each form of government, if only with a view to making laws. For the same laws cannot be equally suited to all oligarchies or to all democracies, since there is certainly more than one form both of democracy and of oligarchy."  

"...good fellowship springs from friendship; when men are at enmity with one another, they would rather not even share the same path."  

"A state, then, only begins to exist when it has attained a population sufficient for a good life in the political community: it may indeed, if it somewhat exceed this number, be a greater state. But, as I was saying, there must be a limit. What should be the limit will be easily ascertained by experience. For both governors and governed have duties to perform; the special functions of a governor to command and to judge. But if the citizens of a state are to judge and to distribute offices according to merit, then they must know each other's characters; where they do not possess this knowledge, both the election to offices and the decision of lawsuits will go wrong."  

"For a state is not a mere aggregate of persons, but a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life; and if any of these things be wanting, it is as we maintain impossible that the community can be absolutely self-sufficing. A state then should be framed with a view to the fulfillment of these functions. There must be husbandmen to procure food, and artisans, and a warlike and a wealthy class, and priests, and judges to decide what is necessary and expedient."